ABSTRACT This paper presents an efficient implementation of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) over the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) K-233 curve for 8-bit AVR microcontrollers commonly used for sensor nodes in wireless sensor networks. Until now, several ECC implementations over NIST-compliant curves have been presented on 8-bit sensor nodes. However, most of them do not provide 112-bit security level currently recommended by NIST. Although some works provide more than 112-bit security level, their performance needs to be improved in order to be executed properly on resource-constrained sensor nodes. For optimizing the performance of ECC, we focus on the efficiency of field arithmetics and propose several optimization techniques. First, we present a novel polynomial multiplication technique based on multiplier encoding. The proposed method significantly reduces the required number of registers for a multiplier, which allows the larger block size for the Karatsuba Block-Comb method. The proposed method provides around 17.05% of improvement compared with the best result previously presented. Second, we optimize modular squaring and reduction algorithms considering the features of 8-bit AVR, and each of them provides around 21.86% and 3.7% improvements compared with the related works. With proposed methods, we present two versions of ECC implementation: (highly fast) HF and (highly secure) HS over NIST K-233 curve on an 8-bit ATmega128. Especially, HF version outperforms the best result previously implemented on the same curve by 18.6% and 34.5% for a variable and a fixed-based scalar multiplication, respectively. Furthermore, on the 8-bit AVR platform, our ECC implementation shows the best performance compared with other existing implementations over both NIST-standardized prime or binary curves.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are ad-hoc networks composed mainly of hundreds or thousands of tiny sensor nodes and they have been widely used for various applications such as monitoring services, battlefield reconnaissance, emergency rescue operations, and so on, in the recent past. Sensor nodes use wireless channel which is considered to be easy to eavesdrop or change messages and WSNs are often deployed in unattended environments where they can be easily captured or compromised by adversaries. That is why security mechanism is an integral factor for ensuring reliable and secure services on WSNs. However, achieving security on WSNs is not easy because sensor nodes in WSNs are battery-powered and very resource-constrained with respect to computing and memory capabilities. For example, MICAz mote, one of the most widely used sensor motes, equips an 8-bit AVR ATmega128 microcontroller, which is clocked at 7.3728 MHz and has 4Kbytes of RAM and 128Kbytes of ROM.
In early days, it had been thought that Public-Key Cryptosystems (PKCs) were infeasible in resource-constrained sensor nodes and thus, many symmetric-key-based security protocols were proposed for securing communications on WSNs. However, they have several limitations such as inefficient key management, complex key exchange structure, and so on. Thus, many researches have been tried to apply PKCs such as RSA, DSA, and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for secure key establishment and efficient key management to WSNs. ECC has been regarded as a better choice for WSNs than conventional PKCs such as RSA, DSA, and DH (DiffieHellman), because it provides equivalent security with much smaller key sizes. For example, the security level of 160-bit key in ECC is equivalent to that of 1024-bit key in RSA. Thus, using ECC results in lower memory and bandwidth consumption on WSNs. Furthermore, through many researches, it is known that a scalar multiplication, the most expensive part of all ECC-based protocols, takes only 5% to 10% of the execution time of a modular exponentiation needed for RSA at the same security level [1] , [2] .
Recently, many ECC implementations over NISTcompliant curves on 8-bit sensor motes have been reported in the literature and their main purpose is to optimize the performance of a scalar multiplication, which is the most time-consuming part of ECC-based protocols [1] - [12] . Even though they could prove the feasibility of using ECC on 8-bit AVR microcontrollers by making full use of well-known optimization algorithms at each level of ECC implementation hierarchy (We will cover the detail about the ECC implementation hierarchy in Section II), most of them do not provide 112-bit security level currently recommended by U.S. NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). According to the recommended key sizes from NIST [13] , [14] , ECC implementations providing at least 112-bit security should be used from 2016 to 2030. Therefore, we present an optimized ECC implementation over NIST-compliant K-233 curve providing 112-bit security on the popular 8-bit AVR ATmega128 microcontroller. To optimize the performance of the scalar multiplication, we focus on developing efficient field arithmetic algorithms in polynomial multiplication, modular squaring, and reduction. In particular, since the polynomial multiplication occupies almost 80% of a scalar multiplication, it is crucial to optimize the performance of the polynomial multiplication for efficiency.
A. ECC IMPLEMENTATIONS ON 8-bit AVR MICROCONTROLLERS
In the past decades, several ECC implementations have been presented on 8-bit AVR microcontrollers. They can be divided into two types of implementation: one over prime curves and the other over binary curves. In this section, we use cc notation for clock cycles timing.
1) ECC IMPLEMENTATIONS OVER PRIME CURVES
Gura et al. [3] presented the first implementation results of prime field ECC and RSA on 8-bit AVR microcontrollers. The work demonstrated that if traditional PKCs were efficiently implemented considering the characteristics of target devices, they can be feasible for resource-constrained devices. For optimizing the performance of PKCs, they focused on the underlying field multiplication occupying around 80% of PKC operation such as an exponentiation in RSA or a scalar multiplication in ECC. Then they proposed the new hybrid multiplication method, which makes full use of available registers on 8-bit AVR by combining the row-wise and the column-wise multiplication methods. Gura et al.'s implementation over NIST P-224 curve could compute a scalar multiplication within 17,520,000 cc on 8-bit AVR microcontroller clocked at 8MHz. TinyECC [4] was the first well-known classic cryptographic library for 8-bit AVR-based, 16-bit MSP-based, and 32-bit ARM-based sensor nodes. TinyECC supports several NIST-recommended elliptic curve domain parameters, ranging from P-128 to P-192. For efficiency, TinyECC applied several well-known optimization techniques such as hybrid multiplication for field multiplication and sliding window methods for scalar multiplication. In case of P-192, TinyECC could compute a scalar multiplication within 21,381,120 cc. Uhsadel et al. [5] presented an estimated timing of 5,603,328 cc for computing a scalar multiplication over P-160 curve on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller running at 7.3728MHz. The latest work regarding ECC implementation over NIST prime curve on 8-bit AVR microcontroller is from [1] and [2] . Namely, Liu et al. implemented all primitives for ECDH and ECDSA protocols over NIST P-192 on 8-bit ATmega128 processor and got timings of 3,460,000 cc and 8,620,000 cc for a fixed-base scalar multiplication and a variable-base scalar multiplication, respectively.
Recently, several new types of ECC curves such as Curve25519 [15] , MoTE Curve [16] , [17] , Kummer surface [18] , and FourQ [19] have been developed for high security level. Hutter and Schwabe [20] presented the first result of the Networking and Cryptography library (NaCl) on the 8-bit AVR family of microcontrollers. They included Curve25519 curve providing 128-bit security as an ECC primitive in NaCl, and a scalar multiplication on the curve consumed 22,791,579 cc. DÃĳll et al. also optimized X25519 key-exchange protocol over Curve25519 for 8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP430X, and 32-bit ARM Cortex-M0 microcontrollers, and they achieved 13,900,397 cc for 8-bit ATmega2560 processor [21] . Renes et al. presented µKummer implementation on 8-bit AVR ATmega and got a timing of 9,513,536 cc for a full scalar multiplication. In [17] , Liu et al. presented ECC implementations over MoTE curves [16] , the next generation lightweight curves, on 8-bit AVR and 16-bit MSP processors. On 8-bit ATmega128 processor, their implementation over P223 MoTE curve consumes 6,048,000 cc and 12,879,000 cc for a fixed-base scalar multiplication and a variable-base scalar multiplication. Among the new types of aforementioned curves on 8-bit AVR platforms, FourQ provides the best performance. Liu et al. presented highly optimized FourQ implementation on 8-bit AVR ATxmega256A3 microcontroller and their implementation consumed 3,007,300 cc and 6,561,500 cc for a fixed-base scalar multiplication and a variable-base scalar multiplication [22] .
In summary, with regard to NIST prime curves providing at least 112-bit security on 8-bit AVR platforms, Liu et al.'s work over NIST P-192 curve provides the best performance as 3,460,000 cc and 8,620,000 cc for a fixed-base scalar multiplication and a variable-base scalar multiplication, respectively [2] . Regarding the new types of curves, FourQ implementation provides the best performance as 3,007,300 cc and 6,561,500 cc for each of a fixed-base and a variable-base scalar multiplication [22] .
2) ECC IMPLEMENTATIONS OVER BINARY CURVES
Compared to ECC implementations over prime curves on 8-bit AVR platforms, the number of ECC implementations over binary curves is relatively small. This is because the most time-consuming operation in ECC operations is polynomial multiplication, and 8-bit AVR does not provide a generic carryless multiplier for polynomial multiplication. 1 Therefore, multiplication over binary fields is much slower than that over prime fields on 8-bit AVR platforms. Malan et al. [6] implemented ECC over 163-bit binary curve for ECDH key agreement protocol. However, their implementation showed that the computation cost of 251,862,220 cc was expensive for the embedded processors. Yan and Shi implemented ECC over GF (2 163 ) and it computed a scalar multiplication over 163-bit binary curve in 111,183,513 cc [7] , which was still high to be used on 8-bit AVR. Eberle et al. implemented ECC over GF (2 163 ) in Assembly language and obtained a timing of 331,20,000 cc for computing a scalar multiplication [8] . NanoECC showed that a scalar multiplication over K-163 curve could be computed in 15,925,248 cc on 8-bit MICAz sensor clocked at 7.3728MHz [9] . For efficiency of polynomial multiplication, they utilized López-Dahab's LUT-based polynomial multiplication method (so-called wLtR comb method) and Karatsuba method [23] . Seo et al. [10] presented TinyECCK, which is the first ECC implementation over K-163 Koblitz curve on 8-bit ATmega128. They showed that the ECC implementation over binary Koblitz curve can be faster than that over prime curve if it is optimized properly by improving the performance of field arithmetics such as polynomial multiplication and reduction. For efficiency of polynomial multiplication, they optimized wLtR comb method by reducing the number of redundant memory accesses, and they replaced computation of ECDBL with cheap field squarings by utilizing the property of Koblitz curves. Finally, they achieved a timing of 8,404,992 cc for a scalar multiplication. Kargl et al. implemented a scalar multiplication over GF (2 167 ) optimal extension field (OEF) with Montgomery Ladder for SPA-resistance and got a timing of 6,100,462 cc on an 8-bit AVR clocked at 8MHz [24] . Aranha et al. presented highly optimized ECC implementations over Koblitz curves [11] . They implemented K-163 and K-233 Koblitz curves on an 8-bit ATmega128 processor clocked at 7.3728MHz, and they achieved timings of 2,138,112 cc (resp. 4,866,048 cc) and 2,359,296 cc (resp. 5,382,144 cc) for a fixed-base scalar multiplication and a variable-base scalar multiplication over K-163 curve (resp. K-233 curve). For efficiency, they introduced a rotating register mechanism for López et al.'s LUT-based polynomial multiplication. Seo et al. [12] optimized the polynomial multiplication over GF (2 163 ) with their proposed Karatsuba Block-Comb (KBC) multiplication method, and achieved a timing of 2,138,112 cc for a variable-base scalar multiplication over K-163 Koblitz curve on 8-bit AVR.
In summary, with respect to K-163 curve providing 80-bit security level on 8-bit AVR platforms, Seo et al.'s work provides the best performance as 2,138,112 cc for a variable-base scalar multiplication [12] . Regarding to K-233 curve providing 112-bit security level, Aranha et al.'s work achieved the best timing result as 4,866,048 cc and 5,382,144 cc for a fixed-base scalar multiplication and a variable-base scalar multiplication, respectively [11] .
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Presenting a novel polynomial multiplication. We propose a new method which can significantly improve the performance of Block-Comb (BC)-based polynomial multiplication. Through the proposed multiplier encoding, the proposed multiplication method significantly reduces the required number of registers for a multiplier from O(n) to O (1) . The method scans the multiplier in bit-wise rather than traditional byte-wise, which increases the size of block and significantly reduces the number of partial products. The method is also well integrated with Karatsuba method. Finally, the polynomial multiplication over GF (2 233 ) requires only 6,896 and 6,248 clock cycles for w/ and w/o encoding, which achieves 17.05% and 24.84% of improvements compared with the best result previously presented, respectively.
• Optimized Modular Squaring and Reduction. We also present optimized implementations of modular squaring and reduction for GF(2 233 ) on 8-bit AVR. The proposed modular squaring and reduction could achieve around 21.86% and 3.7% of improvements compared with the previous best results over GF (2 233 ).
• Developing two versions of HF (Highly-Fast) and HS (Highly-Secure) ECC implementation. We present two versions of ECC implementation. HF version focuses on performance and it outperforms the previous best results on the same curve by 18.6% and 34.5% for a variable and a fixed-based scalar multiplication, respectively. The HS ensures security against Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) by using regular wTNAF method and randomized coordinate system, respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly introduce the basic of ECC including Koblitz curves and its implementation hierarchy, and we also describe the main features of the 8-bit AVR ATmega128 processor. Section III overviews the previous state-of-art VOLUME 6, 2018 implementations of polynomial multiplication over 8-bit AVR platforms. In Section IV, we describe the proposed field arithmetic algorithms, especially the proposed polynomial multiplication technique, optimized for 8-bit AVR processors. Section V describes the rationale for the selection of proper algorithms at an elliptic curve operation level. Section VI describes our approaches for SCA security. Section VII compares our implementation with other existing ECC implementations over 8-bit AVR platforms. Finally, we conclude the paper with some future works in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the overview of ECC over GF(2 m ), its implementation hierarchy, and the characteristics of 8-bit AVR microprocessors.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY AND KOBLITZ CURVES
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [25] - [27] , introduced by Neal Koblitz and Victor S. Miller in 1985, is one of the most widely used Public Key Cryptosystems (PKCs). The security of ECC is based on the hardness of ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem), and it is believed that ECC provides an equivalent security level of existing PKCs such as RSA and DSA with a much smaller key size. 2 An elliptic curve E over a field K is a set of solutions (x, y) ∈ K × K which satisfies following Weierstrass equation
where a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 6 ∈ K and the curve discriminant is = 0; together with a point at infinity denoted by O. If K is GF(2 m ), then the curve is called a binary curve. Koblitz curves [25] , [26] , [28] are special curves among binary curves, and they are defined as a following equation.
where a ∈ {0, 1}. Given an elliptic point P = (x, y) ∈ GF(2 m ) and an integer k, the operation k · P is called scalar multiplication (SM ). Since SM is a computationally dominant operation in ECC-based security protocols, such as ECDH key agreement, ECIES encryption, and ECDSA signature algorithms, it needs to be computed efficiently. Computing k · P (σ m−1 i=0 k i 2 i P where k i is i-th bit of k) is composed of two types of elliptic curve operations: Elliptic Curve Point Addition (ECADD) which adds two different points such as (P 1 + P 2 ) and Elliptic Curve Point Doubling (ECDBL) which doubles a point such as (2P 1 ). 3 Unlike ordinary binary curves, Koblitz curves have an advantage such that ECDBL can be replaced by efficiently computable Frobenius map τ (x, y) = (x 2 , y 2 ), τ (∞) = ∞ with τ expansion of scalar k. Thus, the performance of SM on Koblitz curves can be much improved compared with that on ordinary binary curves.
We target on the efficient ECC implementation over K-233 Koblitz curve recommended by NIST standard. This curve provides at least 112-bit security satisfying the current key size recommended by NIST [13] , [14] . Indeed, K-233 curve is currently included in approved algorithm list of NIST CAVP (Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program) [29] in CMVP (Cryptographic Module Validation Program) [30] and thus, it is widely used in certificated cryptographic modules including OpenSSL and BouncyCastle [31] . 
B. IMPLEMENTATION HIERARCHY OF KOBLITZ CURVES
In order to implement ECC protocols, three levels of operations are required. Fig. 1 describes the implementation hierarchy of Koblitz curve-based ECC and its corresponding arithmetic algorithms. Since the selections of algorithms at each level directly affect the performance of ECC implementation, it is necessary to carefully select proper algorithms to implement them considering the features of target platforms in terms of instruction sets, memory sizes, and a length of register files (In Section V, we will describe our selection of proper algorithms for an optimal performance in detail).
A scalar multiplication (SM) which computes k · P for given a scalar k and point P is a computationally dominant operation in ECC-based security protocols. An SM requires elliptic curve point arithmetics such as ECADDs and ECDBLs. Many optimization algorithms including sliding window [32] , Comb-based method [33] , wTNAF [28] have been proposed for optimizing the performance of SM, and their aim is to reduce the number of ECADDs when computing an SM (Note that with wTNAF, ECDBL can be replaced by efficiently computable Frobenius map).
ECADD and ECDBL are composed of field arithmetics such as field multiplication, squaring, reduction, addition, and inversion. Especially, each of ECADD and ECDBL in an affine coordinate system requires operating a field inversion, and this is the most expensive operation in field arithmetics (It is known that I M > 30 on 8-bit AVR platforms). To replace field inversion with other relatively cheap field arithmetics, efficient coordinate systems, such as projective, Jacobian, and López-Dahab (LD), and mixed coordinate systems [26] , [34] , have been proposed. Except for field inversion, field multiplication (polynomial multiplication in GF(2 m )) is the most expensive operation when computing an SM (it occupies almost 80% of computational overhead). Thus, the main purpose in this paper is to develop an efficient polynomial multiplication method by maximizing the use of available registers in 8-bit AVR platforms. Field squaring and reduction need to be carefully implemented because they are also one of the most frequently used operations in elliptic curve operations.
C. 8-bit AVR MICROCONTROLLER
Nowadays, 8-bit AVR microprocessors are widely used for various applications such as smartcards and sensor nodes in WSN. An 8-bit AVR, such as Atmel ATmega128, has 32 general-purpose registers (R 31 , . . . , R 1 , R 0 ) and six of them are used for memory address pointers (Each pair of (R 26 , R 27 ), (R 28 , R 29 ), and (R 30 , R 31 ) are aliased as X , Y , and Z pointer register, respectively) [35] . The AVR microprocessors have separate memory areas and buses for program and data in a simple single-issue pipeline. It has a total of 133 instructions, and each instruction has a fixed latency. For example, the arithmetic/logical instructions (e.g. arithmetic add ADD, bit-wise XOR EOR, logical shift left LSL and so on) are executed in a single clock cycle, while memory access instructions (e.g. load LD, store ST and so on) take two clock cycles [35] . 8-bit AVR has limited computation and memory capabilities. For example, in case of 8-bit Atmega128, it has only 4Kbytes of RAM and 128Kbytes of ROM, and it runs at 7.3728MHz.
III. POLYNOMIAL MULTIPLICATION ON 8-bit AVR PLATFORMS
Since polynomial multiplication is the most performancecritical operation when computing an SM, many studies for optimizing an arithmetic on 8-bit AVR platforms have been conducted [10] - [12] , [36] - [39] . They are mainly divided into two categories: LUT-based methods (known as wLtR Comb) [10] , [11] , [36] , [37] and Block-Comb (BC)-based methods [12] , [38] , [39] . Since the number of available registers is limited on 8-bit AVR (only 26 general purpose registers, except for 6 memory address pointer registers, are available), a number of memory accesses occur when computing polynomial multiplication. For example, at least 120 registers are required to hold a whole set of a multiplicand, a multiplier, and a result of polynomial multiplication over GF (2 233 ). However, since only 26 registers are available, only some parts of operands can be maintained in the registers, which results in a number of redundant memory accesses. Thus, the main concern of researches on polynomial multiplication on 8-bit AVR microcontrollers is to minimize the number of redundant memory accesses by optimizing the use of available registers.
Before describing our proposed polynomial multiplication method, this section briefly describes existing polynomial multiplication methods and some notations on 8-bit AVR platforms. [26] , [36] .
A. POLYNOMIAL MULTIPLICATION AND SOME NOTATIONS

Polynomial multiplication is
Throughout the paper, we will use following notations. 
B. LOOK-UP TABLE METHOD
Look-Up Table ( LUT)-based polynomial multiplication, originally introduced by Hankerson et al. [26] and López and Dahab [36] , is an extension of LtR Comb method (so-called wLtR Comb method), and it executes polynomial multiplication by w-bit unit rather than single bit unit at the expense of a precomputation table, which results in the reduction of the number of bit operations such as shift and XOR operations. It first builds a precomputation table about all possible results of A · u(z) for all polynomials u(z) of degree at most w − 1. Then, it scans multiplier B by w-bit unit at a time from MSB to LSB and takes the corresponding value from the precomputation table, and the value is XORed with the intermediate result without computing it. On 8-bit AVR platforms, it is known that 4-bit is the optimal width w for LUT-based method, which requires 16×m-bit of RAM memory for accommodating a table composed of 16 polynomials from 0·A to (z 3 +z 2 + z+1)·A. LUT-based method has been widely implemented on 8-bit AVR platforms [10] , [11] , [37] . Seo et al. implemented 163-bit polynomial multiplication with NesC language on 8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller, and they improved the original LUT-based method by reducing the number of redundant memory accesses by combining two iterations of the main loop into one [10] . Aranha et al. [11] and Oliveira et al. [37] introduced a rotating register mechanism which could significantly reduce the number of memory accesses for LUT-based polynomial multiplication method. They implemented the proposed method in Assembly language and achieved timings of 4,508 cc, 8,314 cc, and 11,727 cc for computing each polynomial multiplication over GF (2 163 ), GF(2 233 ), and GF(2 271 ), respectively. Even though LUT-based methods provide good performance, they are inherently vulnerable to side channel analysis (SCA) using memory-address information [40] , [41] due to huge memory accesses. Furthermore, they require relatively large RAM consumption considering the limited RAM size of 4Kbytes on 8-bit AVR platforms.
C. BLOCK-COMB METHOD
As an alternative to LUT-based methods, Block-Comb (BC) method was firstly introduced in [38] for efficient polynomial multiplication of η T pairing computation on 8-bit Atmega128 microcontroller. In BC method, a multiplier and a multiplicand are divided into equal-sized blocks of s-byte, and partial products of divided multiplicands and multipliers are computed in a column-wise fashion. In other words, in BC method, the available registers are divided into three parts: s registers for a block-sized multiplicand, s registers for a block-sized multiplier, and 2s+1 for the result of partial products. Since the intermediate results are maintained in 2s + 1 working registers, the results of partial products belonging to the same column can be directly updated to the registers without accessing memory, which reduces the number of redundant memory accesses. Shirase et al. [38] concluded that the optimal block size s is 6 because (4s + 1) < 26. The original BC computes a polynomial multiplication over GF (2 239 ) within 9,511 clock cycles (cc).
Seo et al. extended the size of block from 6 to 7 by suggesting Unbalanced Block-Comb method (UBC) for GF (2 163 ) multiplication [39] . They utilized the fact that the tested bits of a multiplier are no longer necessary during the process of a partial product, and recycled this register for holding the Most Significant Byte of the multiplicand. As a result, the extended block size reduces the number of partial products from 16 to 9 when computing a polynomial multiplication over GF (2 163 ) (Note that 7-word (resp. 6-word) block size divides 163-bit polynomial into three blocks (resp. four blocks)). Afterward, Seo et al. proposed Karatsuba Block-Comb method by combining Karatsuba technique with Block-Comb [12] , which reduces the number of partial products further from 9 to 6 at the expense of several cheap field additions when computing a polynomial multiplication over GF (2 163 ).
From these researches, it is widely believed that the maximum block size in BC-base methods is 7 (56-bit). However, we need to extend the block size for efficient polynomial multiplication over larger fields for providing at least 112-bit security.
IV. PROPOSED FIELD ARITHMETIC ALGORITHMS
In this section, we describe our optimization strategies for efficient arithmetics in multiplication, squaring, and reduction over GF(2 233 ) on 8-bit AVR platform. Especially, with respect to polynomial multiplication, our method breaks the common idea that the maximum block size of BC-based methods on 8-bit AVR microcontrollers is 7-byte. 
Algorithm 1
Load
Load R 22+l ← B[l] 7: end for 8: R 21 ← 0 9: for l = 0 to 7 do 10:
for m = 0 to 6 do 11:
if the l-th bit of R 22+m == 1 then 12:
for n = 0 to 7 do 13: Our proposed polynomial multiplication method is basically based on BC method, and its main idea is reordering the process of BC method. Alg. 1 describes the basic of BC method for 56-bit polynomial multiplication [12] , [39] . 4 The sets of registers are reserved for holding a multiplicand (R 21 , . . . , R 14 ), a multiplier (R 28 , . . . , R 22 ), and an accumulator (R 13 , . . . , R 0 ).
Step 4-7 load multiplicand A and multiplier B and Step 9-20 compute partial products with RtL (Rightto-Left) Comb fashion 5 [26] . In the main loop of the product, l-th bit of the registers holding the bit of the multiplier is tested from l = 0 to l = 7. In other words, l-th bit of each register (R 22+m , 0 ≤ m ≤ 6) for the multiplier is tested and if the bit is set, the multiplicand is XORed with the accumulator through Step 12-14. In particular, the multiplier should be maintained in the set of registers, since every register in this set is scanned during each loop of the partial product computation. In the proposed method, on the other hand, only one register is required for maintaining the multiplier in the process of partial product through multiplier-encoding. Thus, the proposed Block-Comb method can extend the block size of BC method with the saved registers and significantly reduces the number of partial products required for computing polynomial multiplication.
In order to encode the bits of multiplier B, the following Equation 3 is required.
The Equation moves the i-th bit of the multiplier to E(i)-th bit position in the encoded multiplier. Each bit column of eight-byte groups in the original multiplier is packed and transposed into a byte row in the encoded multiplier. On 8-bit AVR microcontroller, this encoding process can be efficiently implemented with lsr (logical shift right) and ror (rotate right) instructions. Alg. 2 shows the proposed encoding method over GF(2 233 ) on 8-bit AVR microcontroller. 6 The original 233-bit multiplier is divided into four groups, consisting of 8-byte, as on the left side of Figure 2 . Each group ranging from 0 to 2 has 8-byte, but Group 3 has 6-byte because the multiplier is in GF(2 233 ), which only occupies 233-bit. This is why the encoding process for Group 3 is slightly different from that for Group 0, 1, and 2. In Alg. 2, each byte of a group is right-shifted for packing each bit column of bytes groups with a lsr instruction and the packed bits are held in R 8 register with a ror instruction. The encoded multiplier is stored in EB and the size of EB is slightly larger than B (The size of EB is 32-byte while the size of B is 30-byte). The right side of Figure 2 shows the result of the proposed multiplier encoding over GF (2 233 ). 6 Since the proposed method is generic, the method can be applied to the other bit lengths and microprocessors with simple modifications.
Algorithm 2 Proposed Multiplier Encoding Over GF(2 233 ) on 8-bit AVR Microcontroller
Require: Multiplier B over GF(2 233 ).
Ensure: Encoded multiplier EB.
(Encoding from Group 0 to Group 2) 1:
for j = 0 to 7 do 4:
clr R 8 
5:
for k = 0 to 7 do 6: lsr R k 7:
ror R 8 In Alg. 3, the proposed Block-Comb multiplication algorithm for computing a 64-bit partial product is described. It computes a partial product with RtL Comb fashion using the encoded multiplier EB. In particular, it only uses a single register for holding target bits of the multiplier, since each byte of EB contains each bit column of the original VOLUME 6, 2018 multiplier's eight-byte groups (Alg. 3 reserves 16 registers, 9 registers, and a single register for holding an accumulator, a multiplicand, and a multiplier during the process of computing partial products, respectively). Thus, the proposed method reduces the number of required registers for holding a multiplier of n words from O(n) to O (1) . With the proposed Block-Comb, a polynomial multiplication over GF (2 233 ) can be computed with sixteen 64-bit partial products.
2) INTEGRATION WITH KARATSUBA TECHNIQUE
The number of partial products is optimized again by applying Karatsuba method. Since the size of the proposed Block-Comb method is 8 words (64-bit) on 8-bit AVR microcontroller, the operands over GF (2 233 ) are divided into four-term polynomials so that a multiplicand
+B 0 where x is 2 64 . The detailed computations are given in Equation 4 . 
A(x) · B(x)
= (M 3 x 3 + M 2 x 2 + M 1 x + M 0 ) · (x 3 + x 2 + x + 1) + M 8 x 3 + (M 5 x 2 + M 4 ) · (x 3 + x) + (M 7 x + M 6 ) · (x 3 + x 2 ) M 0 = A 0 × 64−bit B 0 , M 1 = A 1 × 64−bit B 1 , M 2 = A 2 × 64−bit B 2 , M 3 = A 3 × 64−bit B 3 , M 4 = (A 1 ⊕ A 0 ) × 64−bit (B 1 ⊕ B 0 ), M 5 = (A 3 ⊕ A 2 ) × 64−bit (B 3 ⊕ B 2 ), M 6 = (A 2 ⊕ A 0 ) × 64−bit (B 2 ⊕ B 0 ), M 7 = (A 3 ⊕ A 1 ) × 64−bit (B 3 ⊕ B 1 ), M 8 = (A 3 ⊕A 2 ⊕A 1 ⊕ A 0 )× 64−bit (B 3 ⊕ B 2 ⊕ B 1 ⊕ B 0 ) (4)1: C = A[7 · · · 0] × 64−bit EB[7 · · · 0] 2: C = C ⊕ A[15 · · · 8] × 64−bit EB[15 · · · 8] 3: C = C ⊕ A[23 · · · 16] × 64−bit EB[23 · · · 16] 4: C = C ⊕ A[29 · · · 24] × 64−bit EB[31 · · · 24] 5: C = C ⊕ (C 64) ⊕ (C 128) ⊕ (C 192) 6: C = C ⊕ [(A[7 · · · 0]) ⊕ A[15 · · · 8] ⊕ A[23 · · · 16] ⊕ A[29 · · · 24]) × 64−bit (EB[7 · · · 0]) ⊕ EB[15 · · · 8] ⊕ EB[23 · · · 16] ⊕ EB[31 · · · 24])] 7: T = (A[29 · · · 24] ⊕ A[23 · · · 16]) × 64−bit (EB[31 · · · 24] ⊕ EB[23 · · · 16]) 8: T = T ⊕ [(A[15 · · · 8]⊕A[7 · · · 0]) × 64−bit (EB[15 · · · 8]⊕EB[7 · · · 0])] 9: C = C ⊕ (T 64) ⊕ (T 192) 10: T = (A[29 · · · 24] ⊕ A[15 · · · 8]) × 64−bit (EB[31 · · · 24] ⊕ EB[15 · · · 8]) 11: T = T ⊕ [(A[23 · · · 16] ⊕ A[7 · · · 0]) × 64−bit (EB[23 · · · 16] ⊕ EB[7 · · · 0])] 12: C = C ⊕ (T 128) ⊕ (T 192) 13: return (C)
Algorithm 5 Regular Window TNAF (wTNAF) Method [46]
Require: n-bit scalar k = (k n−1 , . . . , 1, 0) 2 , point P ∈ E(F 2 m ) Ensure: R = k · P. Alg. 4 shows the proposed Karatsuba-based Block-Comb multiplication method. In order to utilize the Karatsuba technique, the original multiplier B is firstly turned into the encoded multiplier EB by calling Alg. Table 1 compares the proposed method with other BC-based methods with respect to the block size and the required number of block-wise partial products when computing a polynomial multiplication over different bit lengths. Compared with BC, UBC, and KBC, the proposed method requires much reduced number of block-wise partial products by up-to 77%, 73%, and 30%, respectively. In Table 2 , the required number of registers for a multiplicand, a multiplier, and an [39] , and Karatsuba Block-Comb [12] , respectively. acc means the number of registers for an accumulator) when computing each partial product in the process of polynomial multiplication over GF (2 233 ) on 8-bit AVR microcontroller. accumulator is given when computing each partial product in the process of polynomial multiplication. The proposed method reduces the number of registers from 29 to 26 with even smaller number of block-wise partial products than the previous works do.
We have implemented the proposed multiplication method with AVR assembly language on 8-bit AVR ATmega128 microcontroller. Table 3 compares the performance with the previous state-of-art results over GF (2 233 ). The proposed multiplication algorithm shows about 27.49% better performance than the original BC method [38] computing binary field multiplication over GF (2 239 ). This performance enhancement can be further optimized by using offline encoding for certain fixed parameters. 7 The method without encoding requires 34.3% lesser than the original BC. The proposed method with (resp. without) the encoding process also provides about 22.53% (resp. 29.81%) of improved performance compared with KBC [12] . Note that the proposed multiplication method with (resp. without) the encoding process provides about 17.05% (resp. 24.84%) of enhanced performance compared with the previous best-known result from [11] .
B. OTHER FIELD ARITHMETICS PROPOSED
Modular squaring and reduction operations are also one of the most frequently used operations during scalar multiplication. Thus, we additionally optimize them by considering the characteristics of the underlying field and by maximizing the use of registers on 8-bit AVR microcontrollers.
1) OPTIMIZATION OF FIELD SQUARING
To optimize the modular squaring, we propose table-based modular squaring, which combines squaring and reduction processes. Our method makes use of two kinds of tables: 8-bit wise ordinary squaring , a 6 , . . . , a 0 ), the result of T 8 is (0, a 7 , 0, a 6 , . . . , 0, a 0 ) . Thus, T 8 requires 512 bytes. While ordinary squaring table T 8 is constant regardless of the base field, modular squaring table needs to be carefully constructed considering the property of the used irreducible polynomial. The implementation for 8-bit modular squaring with f 233 (z) = z 233 + z 74 + 1 8 requires five bytes for one byte modular squaring. Figure 3 shows the example of one byte modular squaring with f 233 (z). In the figure, one byte C [18] [18] 2 is larger than f 233 (z), each bit of C [18] 2 is reduced. From the figure, we find that the reduced bytes are XORed with six bytes (Namely, C [18] 2 is XORed with upper three bytes (C [19] , C [18] , and C [17] ) and lower
Algorithm 6 Proposed Modular Squaring Over GF(2 233 ) on 8-bit AVR Microprocessor
Require: An operand A over GF (2 233 ). Table-based C
j −= 2, k −= 2 10: end for ( Table-based 
three bytes (C [8] , C [7] , and C [6] )). We can reduce the size of one byte modular squaring from six bytes to five bytes by using the fact that MSB (Marked as red-colored zero) of squaring is always zero (Refer to the upper reduction process in Figure 3 ). In our implementation, modular squaring table TR8 is composed of an upper part (TR8H ) and a lower part (TR8L). TR8H and TR8L contain elements to be XORed with upper two bytes and lower three bytes, respectively. Thus, the modular squaring table in our implementation requires 1,280 bytes. Since our strategy requires relatively large table (1,792 bytes in total), we make use of FLASH instead of RAM similar to the works from [12] . Figure 4 depicts the detailed execution of the proposed modular squaring mechanism including register arrangement for accumulator C. In the figure, a set of register files (R 21 , . . . , R 0 ) is used to hold accumulator C containing the intermediate reduction result with the rotating register manner. It mainly consists of table-based squaring, table-based modular squaring, and on-the-fly reduction. With respect to squaring and modular squaring, it makes use of T 8, TR8H , and TR8L tables. When computing table-based modular squaring, the upper two bytes and the lower three bytes are XORed with TR8H and TR8L as A[i] index. Note that in our implementation the accumulator is accommodated within general-purpose registers. Since the number of registers is limited, we extend the concept of the rotating register mechanism in [11] to our implementation to keep the values of accumulator C. Since C[39] , . . . , C [30] are larger than degree z 233 , they need to be reduced once again. Our implementation reduces C [39] , . . . , C [30] in an on-the-fly manner. Note that since C [39] , . . . , C [30] are kept in the registers, on-the-fly reduction can be faster than table-based reduction (They are kept in registers from R 21 to R 12 ). For reducing the number of redundant Store operations, our implementation reduces them by two words. In the figure, registers marked by yellow color are stored in accumulator C at each step. The detailed algorithm description is given in Appendix (Refer to Alg. 6 in Appendix).
2) OPTIMIZATION OF FIELD REDUCTION
With respect to field reduction over GF (2 233 ), we extend the rotating register mechanism in [11] 
}. Thus, we maintain the shifted values and the intermediate reduction results in the available registers to reduce redundant LOAD operations, and combine the three bytes reduction processes into one for reducing redundant STORE operations. Thus, the two-byte results are stored in memory at each step of our reduction mechanism. Then, the registers used to keep the shifted values and the intermediate results are assigned for reducing the next three bytes. Figure 5 describing the detailed process of the proposed reduction method is given in Appendix.
We have implemented the proposed modular squaring and reduction mechanisms with AVR assembly language on 8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller. Table 4 compares the performance of the proposed modular squaring and reduction with the best results previously published. The proposed modular squaring and reduction achieve 21.86% and 3.7% of improvements compared to the work from [11] , respectively.
V. OPTIMIZATION OF ECC IMPLEMENTATION
In addition to the proposed methods in the field arithmetic level, we apply well-known state-of-the-art algorithms in the ECC level for optimizing the performance of scalar multiplication. We target the ECC implementation over NIST-compliant K-233 Koblitz curve. This curve provides at least 112-bit security satisfying the currently recommended key size by NIST [13] , [14] , and it is currently included in an approved algorithm list of NIST CAVP (Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program) [29] in CMVP (Cryptographic Module Validation Program) [30] . Even though many new ECC curves including Curve25519 [15] , Kummer surface [18] , FourQ [19] have been developed recently, NIST curves are still widely used in the industrial area world. Furthermore, since on Koblitz curves, unlike other binary field curves, elliptic curve point doubling (ECDBL) can be computed with efficient computable Frobenius map such as τ (x, y) = (x 2 , y 2 ), τ (∞) = ∞ with τ expansion of scalar k, the ECC implementation over those curves can have a benefit of efficiency compared with other curves.
Following subsections describe our optimization strategies in elliptic curve operation levels to improve the performance of scalar multiplication. Performance result of HF version (k · G and l · P mean fixed-base scalar multiplication and variable-base scalar multiplication, respectively). Timing is measured by clock cycles.
TABLE 6.
Performance result of HS version (k · G and l · P mean fixed-base scalar multiplication and variable-base scalar multiplication, respectively). Timing is measured by clock cycles.
A. SELECTION OF COORDINATE SYSTEM
Scalar multiplication consists of elliptic curve operations, ECADD and ECDBL. ECADD and ECDBL in an affine coordinate system require 1I + 2M (I = field inversion, M = field multiplication). Since the field inversion is the most expensive operation in field arithmetics, it is preferable to reduce the number of field inversions when computing elliptic curve operations. Efficient coordinate systems such as projective, Jacobian, López-Dahab (LD), and mixed coordinate systems, have been presented [26] , [34] . It is known that if the condition (I > 7M ) is met on the target platform, using LD coordinate is more suitable than using affine coordinate (LD requires 14M and 4M for ECADD and ECDBL, respectively). The cost for the finite field inversion using Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) on 8-bit AVR microcontroller is 142,986 cycle [11] , and its cost is much higher than that for modular field multiplication ( I M > 20). Thus, our implementation uses LD coordinate systems with the mixed addition method [26] , [34] . In our implementation using LD coordinate system with the mixed addition method over Koblitz curves, ECADD and ECDBL 9 require 8M + 5S and 3S, respectively.
B. SELECTION OF SCALAR MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM
The scalar multiplication (computing kP, where a k is scalar and P is a point on the curve) is the most time-consuming 9 ECDBL is computed with efficiently computable Frobenius map
part of ECC-based cryptographic protocols and it is composed of a sequence of ECDBL and ECADD. Since ECDBLs in scalar multiplication can be replaced with the efficiently computable Frobenius map, the main concern for improving the performance of scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves is reducing the number of ECADDs. We utilize wTNAF [26] , [42] for optimizing the performance of scalar multiplication. wTNAF is a windowing method of TNAF and it requires a precomputation table composed of (2 w−2 − 1) points. wTNAF computes a scalar multiplication with m w+1 · ECADDs excluding the cost for building a precomputation table, where m is the bit-length of the scalar's TNAF expression.
There are two types of scalar multiplication in ECC-based applications: fixed-base scalar multiplication and variablebase scalar multiplication. In the fixed-base scalar multiplication, the input point is fixed and known beforehand. The typical case of fixed-base scalar multiplication is an ECC key generation process using the recommended base point, and ECIES and fixed-ECDH require the fixed-base scalar multiplication in its encryption/decryption process and key agreement process, respectively. In the variable-base scalar multiplication, the input point is variable and not given. The variable-base scalar multiplication can be found in an encryption process of ECIES, sign/verify of ECDSA, and a key agreement process of ephemeral-ECDH. The difference between fixed-base and variable-base is whether to build a precomputation table online or not. In other words, variable-base scalar multiplication includes the cost for building a precomputation table. Thus, we need to find the optimal width w of wTNAF for both cases. 10 From our experiments, we find that each optimal width w of wTNAF is 5 and 6 for a variable-base multiplication and a fixed-base scalar multiplication on the 8-bit AVR ATmega128 microcontroller running at 7.3728MHz. The use of width 5 and 6 requires 7 and 15 precomputed points, respectively.
When constructing a precomputation table, the points need to be stored in the affine coordinate system in order to compute scalar multiplication with the mixed coordinate system. Since elliptic curve operations in the affine coordinate system require field inversion, our implementation firstly computes the precomputed points in LD coordinate system, and then converts them into the affine coordinate system [44] . Converting n precomputed points in LD coordinate system into the affine coordinate system requires n field inversion operations. Thus, we apply Montgomery trick [45] 
VI. CONSIDERATION OF SIDE CHANNEL ANALYSIS A. FIELD INVERSION
Even though field inversion is the most expensive arithmetic, a few inversions need to be executed as in computing a precomputation table and coordinate conversion from LD coordinate to affine coordinate. For efficient computation of inversion, Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) has been widely used. However, EEA operates irregularly depending on the input data. Since the precomputation table does not include secret information, the use of EEA does not affect the security of implementation. However, the use of basic EEA affects the security of scalar multiplication when computing the final inversion for coordinate conversion [47] . To defend this kind of attack, Fermat-based inversion or a random multiplicative masking method can be used [48] . Even if Fermat-based inversion, i.e. a −1 = a p−2 mod p, allows one to achieve constant execution time, it is significantly slower than the EEA. Thus, our implementation utilizes a simple multiplicative masking method. This multiplicative masking method uses EEA and requires two additional modular multiplications. For example, when computing inverse of x, instead of inverting x directly, we first multiply x by random value r, and then invert the product X = r · x using the EEA to obtain X −1 , and finally multiply the inversion result X −1 by r to get x −1 = X −1 · r. Since the attacker does not know r, he/she is not able to get the actual value of x. In summary, our HF (Highly-Fast) version uses the basic EEA, and HS (Highy-Secure) version utilizes the multiplicative random masking method for computing the final inversion. Note that two versions use EEA when computing the precomputation table.
B. SIDE-CHANNEL RESISTANCE FOR SCALAR MULTIPLICATION
Typical wTNAF is vulnerable to side channel attacks [49] , [50] , such as TA (Timing Attack) and SPA (Simple Power Analysis), because point addition is omitted whenever the value of the tested window is zero, which leaks sensitive information. Oliveira et al. [46] proposed a regular wTNAF-based scalar multiplication method on Koblitz curves. Alg. 5 computes scalar multiplication with a regular pattern, which always conducts (w − 1) Frobenius maps and single ECADD regardless of the scalar value. With the regular wTNAF method, the length of the scalar is 1 + [46] . For finding the optimal window size on the target device, we tested the performance of regular wTNAF and found that 5 and 6 are the optimal window widths for a variable-base scalar multiplication and a fixed-base scalar multiplication, respectively.
Furthermore, our implementation applies the randomized projective coordinate system [50] to the scalar multiplication process in order to randomize the timing difference in field multiplication. For example, when computing field multiplication of ECADD, our implementation uses the randomized coordinates as its multiplier. Thus, the attacker cannot distinguish the real value of the multiplier with TA or SPA. This approach also provides resistance against DPA (Differential Power Analysis) and CPA (Correlation Power Analysis) since the attacker cannot determine the intermediate result of the scalar multiplication [50] .
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
We have implemented full scalar multiplication over NIST K-233 curve on 8-bit AVR Atmega128 microcontroller. Actually, we provide two versions: HF (Highly-Fast) and HS (Highly-Secure). We have optimized the performance of field level arithmetics in polynomial multiplication, modular squaring, field addition, and reduction by AVR assembly language. The elliptic curve arithmetics including ECADD, ECDBL, and scalar multiplication have been implemented with C language. Table 5 shows the performance of HF (Highly-Optimized) version of our ECC implementation using the proposed algorithms. Since this version uses typical wTNAF and EEA as its scalar multiplication method and field inversion method, it does not provide TA (Timing Attack) and SPA (Simple Power Analysis) resistance. When using 4TNAF, 11 with respect to fixed and variable-based scalar multiplication, our software provides about 16.68% and 15.56% of improved performance compared with the work from [11] , respectively. Note that in case of fixed-base (resp. variable-base) scalar multiplication, our software using 6TNAF (resp. 5TNAF) provides about 34.5% (resp. 18.6%) better performance than that from [11] . Table 6 shows the performance of HS (Highly-Secure) version of our ECC implementation using the proposed algorithms. Since this version uses regular wTNAF in Alg. 5 and applies multiplicative masked inversion instead of typical EEA, it provides resistance against both TA (Timing Attack) and SPA (Simple Power Analysis). Furthermore, we utilize the randomized coordinate system to protect timing attack on the field multiplication, which requires only three additional field multiplications. When using 4TNAF, the performance of HS version is lower than that from [11] . This is because HS version utilizes the regular wTNAF providing SPA-resistance, while the work in [11] did not. From our experiments, HS version provides the best performance of fixed-base and variable-base scalar multiplication when using regular 6TNAF and regular 5TNAF, respectively. At this time, our implementation provides about 16.63% improved performance when computing a fixed-base scalar multiplication. However, in case of the variable-base scalar multiplication, its performance becomes about 4.89% lower than that in [11] . Table 7 compares our implementation with other ECC implementations over NIST standard-compliant curves providing more than 80-bit security with respect to SCA resistance, performance, code size, and stack usage. Among implementations without SPA-resistance mecha- Comparison to other ECC implementations over NIST-compliant curves on 8-bit AVR microcontroller (k · G and l · P mean fixed-base scalar multiplication and variable-base scalar multiplication, respectively). Timing is measured by clock cycles. KB and B mean KBytes and Byte, respectively.
TABLE 8.
Comparison to other implementations on recently developed new curves on 8-bit AVR microcontroller (k · G and l · P mean fixed-base scalar multiplication and variable-base scalar multiplication, respectively). Timing is measured by clock cycles.
nisms, HF version provides the best performance. Furthermore, HS also provides the best performance among implementations equipped with SPA-resistance mechanisms. Regarding code size and stack usage, even though our implementation requires slightly larger code size than that in [11] because the proposed polynomial multiplication algorithm is implemented with a loop unrolling manner, it uses much reduced stack usage. Since ATmega128 has limited RAM size as 4Kbyte, RAM usage needs to be optimized. Thus, our implementation requires reasonable amounts of code size and stack usage compared to other ECC implementations over NIST-compliant curves. Table 8 compares our implementation with other state-ofart ECC implementations over new curves. In case of the fixed-base scalar multiplication, since FourQ implementation [22] utilizes 80 precomputed points, we apply 8TNAF to the scalar multiplication, which requires 63 precomputed points. Without a dedicated hardware multiplier on 8-bit AVR microcontroller, our software provides competitive performance compared with other state-of-art implementations.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a highly efficient ECC implementation over NIST K-233 curve, providing 112-bit security recommended by NIST, on an 8-bit AVR ATmega128 processor. For optimizing the performance of ECC, we focus on improving the underlying field arithmetics and propose several optimization techniques. Particularly, we propose a novel polynomial multiplication method based on multiplierencoding, and it significantly reduces the required number of registers for a multiplier, which allows a larger block size for Karatsuba Block-Comb (KBC) method. The proposed method provides around 17.05% of improvement compared with the previous best result, and it can be used for polynomial multiplication in ECC over larger fields as GF (2 283 ) providing a 128-bit security level. With the proposed methods, we present two versions of ECC implementation: HF (Highly-Fast) and HS (Highly-Secure) equipped with some SCA countermeasures. HF version provides the best performance compared with other existing ECC implementations over NIST-compliant curves, and HS version also achieves the best performance among ECC implementations equipped with SCA countermeasures. In the future, we will apply the proposed polynomial multiplication method to ECC over K-283 curve for 128-bit security. 
